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Abstract
Previous studies have viewed Swiss health-care financing as particularly regres-
sive. However, as the OECD Review of the Swiss Health System (2011) stated, the
income-related inequities and the inter cantonal variations are still unexplored due
to a lack of available information. The present paper aims to fill this information
gap concerning the Swiss health system by exploring the diﬀerences in the level
of regressivity of health-care system financing across cantons and over time using
household data. The empirical evidence confirms that the Swiss health-care system
financing has remained quite regressive since the major reform of 1996 and that the
variations in equity across cantons are quite significant. The results are an interest-
ing contribution towards re-thinking a new possible reform of the Swiss health-care
system, as well as for other federal states (such as the U.S.) that use regulation and
subsidies to ensure universal coverage.
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1 Introduction
The idea that health-care services should be paid according to the ability to pay rather
than according to the actual use of the health-care system has its roots in the egalitarian
concept of social justice and is generally accepted in Switzerland, as it is in most of the
OECD countries. It is common in the economic literature to indicate this idea using the
concept of equity in financing.
The relevance of this topic has also been highlighted by the World Health Organization
and the OECD. The World Health Report 2000 focused on the general concept of fair
financing in the health systems, arguing that the degree of fairness in the financing sys-
tem has an important impact on social value (McIntyre 2010). This principle implies
that solidarity between the sick and the healthy, which is implicit in any health insurance
system, determines that the economic burden of health care shifts among the population
according to their ability to pay, regardless of their health status or utilization of health
services. Even if out-of-pocket expenditures, deductibles, and co-payments are generally
excluded from this sort of "solidarity fund", this principle holds for at least the majority
of total health expenditures.
When the new Health Insurance Act (HIA) came into force in 1996, many things changed
in the Swiss health-care system. The main objectives of the act were to guarantee universal
coverage and to equip the political system with better cost containment tools. Moreover,
it also increased the importance of the financing equity aim: one of the objectives of
the reform was to provide monetary assistance to low-income people in order to increase
equity in the financing system. The federal draft bill issued in 1991 (and approved some
years later after many amendments as HIA) reads: ”The main priority of the project is
undoubtedly the strengthening of the solidarity. The current law provides for individual
premiums to be paid without taking into account the economic situation of the people
insured”.
All of the empirical studies on this topic measure the equity of a financing source in terms
of progressivity; that is, the extent to which higher-income people pay more in proportion
to lower-income people. Some studies have demonstrated that the general level of health
system financing is regressive in Switzerland, both before and after the reform (Wagstaﬀ
et al.1999, Bilger 2008). This means that lower-income people pay proportionally more
than higher-income people. Nevertheless, these studies consider only the whole of Switzer-
land and no research has monitored the regressivity issue at the cantonal level. Due to
the Swiss federal setting, each canton diﬀers in the economic strategy it has adopted to
finance the health care system; this leads to diﬀerent levels of equity among them. This
particular aspect of fiscal federalism has not yet been studied in-depth in the health eco-
nomics literature.
This lack of information is also highlighted by the OECD Reviews of Health Systems
(2011, p. 12). The report presents the following as one of the Swiss policy challenges for
2
the future: "Inter-cantonal variations in health financing and access (...) may also mask
inequities. Information currently available does not allow monitoring income-related in-
equities in financing health care."
This paper aims to fill this information gap about the Swiss health-care system. The goal
is to analyze the level of equity in the financing of the Swiss health-care system and the
diﬀerences between cantons in order to help orient future health financing policies. The
results found in this work may have important policy implications and may help institu-
tions shape future development towards policies that more explicitly address the equity
issue. In fact, the present political debate about the Swiss health system financing is
driven by misleading information and there is a widely held perception that the subsidies
distributed to low-income families are enough to smooth the regressivity nature of the
compulsory community rating premiums. However, as the analysis shows, this is not the
case.
In this context, there are two measures of equity. The first is horizontal equity, which
claims equal treatments for equals ; that is, that people with the same income have to
contribute the same amount of money to the total expenditures. The second measure
is vertical equity, which states that people with diﬀerent income must contribute appro-
priate amounts to the total expenditure. The present study has only considered vertical
equity; we have used the methodology suggested by Wagstaﬀ et al. (1992) to compute
the regressivity level of each canton through the Kakwani index (as explained in detail in
section 5).
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a review of the most relevant
literature in this field. We have collected and summarized similar studies conducted for
other countries, as well as for all of Switzerland. Section 3 provides a brief explanation
of Swiss health system financing. Section 4 introduces the dataset and section 5 explains
the technique used and the results obtained. Section 6 discusses the results more in detail
and outlines the limitations of the study. Finally, section 7 oﬀers some conclusions.
2 Literature review
This work finds its place among the studies about the progressivity of health-care system
financing. The most widespread and commonly used technique in this field of research is
the computation of the Kakwani index, which measures the progressivity of a source in
terms of shifting from proportionality. Given the nature of the Kakwani index, which is an
extremely summary measure, many of these studies also add other statistical techniques
in order to obtain more detailed results (such as dominance tests of the concentration
curves).
Many studies have analyzed the progressivity of health system financing at the national
level, while very few studies have explore this issue at the subnational level.
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Table 1 includes the main papers that have been published on this topic and summarizes
the techniques that each has adopted and the results obtained. Some of these studies
have focused on a single country - namely Australia, Iran, Finland, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Malaysia, Palestine, Ireland, Tanzania, Ghana, Sweden, and Switzerland. Two
papers present an international comparison, based on 13 Asian countries and 13 OECD
countries, respectively.
Table 1: Main papers about the equity in the health-care financing system
Country Author(s) and
year
Technique Results in terms of
overall financing pro-
gressivity
Italy Paci P.,
Wagstaﬀ A.
(1993)
Kakawani and Suits index for the
diﬀerent sources of financing.
Regressive
Australia Lairson DR.,
Hindson P. et
al. (1995)
Kakwani index for the four fi-
nancing sources and for the
whole financing system.
Slightly progressive
The Nether-
lands
Wagstaﬀ and
Van Doorslaer
(1997)
AJL method (from a paper
by Aronson,1994), which decom-
poses the redistributive eﬀect
into three parts: progressivity,
horizontal, and reranking com-
ponent.
Regressive
Finland Klavus J. (1998) Kakwani index for the diﬀerent
sources of financing. The paper
computes a significance test for
the progressivity index and cor-
rects for the serial correlation in
the error terms. Dominance test
of the concentration curves.
Slightly progressive
Sweden Gerdtham U.,
Sundberg G.
(1998)
Kakwani index for the four fi-
nancing sources and for the
whole financing system. The
redistributive eﬀect is decom-
posed into vertical, horizontal
and reranking eﬀect. Two diﬀer-
ent periods (1980 and 1990) are
considered.
Weakly progressive sys-
tem for both the periods
considered
Malaysia Ping Yu C.,
Whynes D.,
Sachs T.H
(2008)
Kakwani index for the five fi-
nancing sources and for the
whole financing system.
Slightly progressive
Table 1: Continued on next page
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Table 1: Continued from previous page
Country Authors and
year
Technique Results in terms of
overall financing pro-
gressivity
Switzerland Bilger (2008) Application of the DJA index
(from a paper by Duclos et al.
2003) to compute the redistribu-
tive eﬀect in three parts: verti-
cal, horizontal and reranking ef-
fect.
The system is very regres-
sive even after the reform
of 1996
Palestine Abu-Zaineh M.,
Mataria A., Lu-
chini S., Moatti
J. (2008)
Kakwani index and disaggre-
gated approach (dominance cri-
terion) for each financing source
and for the whole financing sys-
tem. The two regions of the Oc-
cupied Palestinian territory are
included in the study (the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip). Boot-
strap procedure used to assess
the reliability of the standard er-
rors.
The whole system is re-
gressive. The regressivity
of the out-of-pocket pay-
ments is more pronounced
among the worst-oﬀ.
Ireland Smith S. (2010) Kakwani index for the diﬀerent
financing sources. Interpretation
also of the concentration curves
and dominance tests.
Income tax and social in-
surance contributions are
progressive, indirectly tax
regressive. Private in-
surance is progressive at
lower incomes, regressive
at higher incomes.
Tanzania Mtei G., Borghi
J. (2010)
Kakwani index for each financing
source and for the whole financ-
ing system.
Marginally progressive
system.
Iran Alireza M.
(2011)
Kakwani index for both urban
and rural areas.
Rural areas are regressive;
urban areas are mildly re-
gressive.
Ghana Akazili J. et al.
(2011)
Kakwani index and dominance
test for each financing source and
for the whole financing system.
Generally progressive
Table 1: Continued on next page
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Table 1: Continued from previous page
Country Authors and
year
Technique Results in terms of
overall financing pro-
gressivity
13 OECD
countries
10 OECD
countries
Wagstaﬀ A.
et al. (1999)
Wagstaﬀ A. et
al. (1992)
For each country: Kakwani in-
dex for each financing source and
then for the whole financing sys-
tem.
The Netherlands, Ger-
many, Portugal, Sweden,
Switzerland and USA are
regressive. Finland, Italy,
and UK are progressive.
France, Denmark, and
Spain seem to be close
to proportionality, but the
authors did not conduct
a test to check for it.
Note: Finland, Germany,
and Sweden are analyzed
only in the 1999 paper.
13 Asian
countries
O’Donnell O. et
al. (2008)
Kakwani index for the diﬀerent
financing sources and concentra-
tion indices for health care uti-
lization. (Standard errors are
corrected for serial correlation
and heteroscedasticity.)
In Japan, South Korea
and Taiwan, the health
system is slightly regres-
sive, while in the other
countries considered it is
progressive.
Table 1: Concluded from previous pages
As Table 1 clearly shows, the most common approach is to compute the Kakwani
index for the diﬀerent sources of financing and then aggregate them into a measure for
the whole financing system. Nevertheless, there are some diﬀerences in the approaches
that some of the authors have chosen.
Smith (2010), Klavus (1998), Akazili et al. (2011), and Abu-Zaineh et al. (2008) analyzed
the inequity in financing through the Kakwani index as well as through a "disaggregated
approach"; unlike the aggregate summary index approach, this approach provides sum-
mary measures over specific income groups. This approach applies the dominance test
to assess the level of progressivity for diﬀerent decile-levels of income distribution. The
reason for performing this test is that the financing system could be progressive at a cer-
tain decile level and regressive at some others. Abu-Zaineh et al. (2008) found evidence
of similar shapes for both approaches. With the disaggregated approach, however, it is
possible to identify that the regressivity of the out-of-pocket payments is higher for the
worst-oﬀ groups.
Abu-Zaineh et al.’s (2008) paper pays particular attention to the statistical significance
of the inequality measures and applies a Bootstrap method rather than the more common
asymptotic method. Another diﬀerence in the method is the choice of separating the
redistributive eﬀect into three parts: vertical, horizontal, and reranking eﬀect. The works
by Lairson et al. (1995) for Australia and Gerdtham and Sundberg (2008) for Sweden
concentrate on this approach. Bilger (2008) adopted the same approach in the case of
Switzerland. As mentioned, all of the papers presented in the table focus on a single coun-
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try or on a comparison among diﬀerent countries. Abu-Zaineh et al. (2008) and Alireza
(2011), however, went a step further and extended the analysis by computing the Kakwani
index for diﬀerent regions of the country (Palestine and Iran, respectively). Alireza (2001)
applied the Kakwani index technique to Iran for 1997-2007. He separated the urban and
rural areas for the equity analysis and found that the former (Kakwani=-0.022) are less
regressive than the latter (Kakwani=-0.107). The study by Abu-Zaineh et al. (2008) in-
cluded the two regions of the Occupied Palestinian territory (that is, the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip) and found similar regressive results for both regions (Kakwani=-0.067
and Kakwani=-0.047, respectively).
As far as Switzerland is concerned, the issue of the health-care system financing has
been explored by Wagstaﬀ et al. (1992 and 1999) and Bilger (2008). All three papers,
which explore the equity of Swiss health-care financing, provide evidence in favor of highly
regressive financing.
Given that these three works are the most important for the goal of this paper, we present
them in greater detail here.
Wagstaﬀ et al. (1992) presented an international comparison of health-care financing
across 10 countries. Most of these countries are predominantly publicly financed, but
each situation diﬀers according to the share of public financing derived from taxes and
the share raised through social insurance. On this basis, the authors divided the countries
into diﬀerent groups. The first group of countries includes Denmark, Portugal, Ireland,
and the U.K. - all of which are mostly tax-financed systems - while Spain1, the Nether-
lands, and France are mostly social insurance systems. Italy is situated in the middle of
the two groups since the data is relative to a transition period from a social insurance-
based system to a tax-financed system (which came into force in 1978). Finally, the USA
and Switzerland are mostly financed through a private insurance scheme.
For each country, the authors considered the diﬀerent sources of financing; that is, the
general taxation (separated into direct and indirect), the social insurance contributions,
the premiums of voluntary private insurance, and the out-of-pocket payments. The impor-
tance of each financing source varies significantly across countries. For each considered
country, the authors computed two diﬀerent indices to assess the level of progressivity
(or regressivity) of each financing source: the Kakwani index and the Suits index. The
authors then computed a total Suits index and a total Kakwani index for each country,
according to the weighting of each financing source in the total financing.
To perform the analysis, Wagstaﬀ et al.(1992) used micro-data from diﬀerent national
surveys: in the case of Switzerland, they use the SOMIPOPS and SEVS surveys, which
were conducted in 1981 and included data from 3853 households for that year.
The general results demonstrate that only four of the 10 countries (Ireland, Italy, Por-
1Spain left the social insurance scheme in 1989, opting for tax financing. The data used in Wagstaﬀ
et al. (1992) refers to 1980, before this change took place.
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tugal, and the U.K.) have a progressive financing system, while all the others present a
negative Kakwani index. In particular, it is quite evident that tax-financed systems tend
to be more progressive than the other two groups of countries. The result highlighted for
Switzerland is a negative value of both total indexes (-0.117 for the Kakwani index and
-0.112 for the Suits index), which means that the overall financing is regressive. Moreover,
the Swiss healthcare financing was the second most regressive, after the U.S. (Kakwani
index of -0.145).
In 1999, the same authors, along with some others, updated their previous paper with
more recent data. The paper adds some new countries to the international comparison
(Finland, Germany, and Sweden), to present the trends in the financing mix and progres-
sivity and improve the methodology adopted in the previous paper. For Switzerland they
also used a new survey, the Living Conditions Survey, which includes a sample of 5981
Swiss households interviewed in 1992. In line with their previous work, they computed
the Kakwani index for each source of financing and a total weighted Kakwani index, using
as weightings the proportion of each financing source in the total financing. Apart from
some minor exceptions, the general results confirm those obtained in the 1992 paper. In
particular, the analysis for Switzerland shows that the new Kakwani index, based on the
data of 1992, is -0.1402. The conclusion is that in 10 years, the inequity level of financing
grew even worse.
Bilger (2008) provided another important contribution to the analysis of financing equity
in Switzerland. This work is important because it is the first to focus on the equity in
the Swiss health-care system financing after the major reform of 1996.
Bilger’s (2008) main contribution to the economic literature is that, for the first time, he
applied the index proposed by Duclos et al. (2003), obtaining a more eﬃcient decompo-
sition of the redistributive eﬀect. This eﬀect can be divided in three parts: horizontal
inequity, vertical inequity, and re-ranking.
For his analysis, Bilger used the Swiss Household Income and Expenditure Survey (SHIES)
of 1998, which contains data from 9295 Swiss households (this is the same survey used in
the present paper).
Bilger computed the share of each source of financing for all of Switzerland and then de-
composed the redistributive eﬀect for each of the sources. He found evidence that health
system financing in post-reform Switzerland remains very regressive. In particular, the
conclusions state that the reform failed to reduce vertical inequity.
Starting from this strand of literature, the current paper aims to go even further. All
of the previous studies have concentrated on equity at the national level. Apart from the
two previously noted exceptions (regarding Iran and Palestine), this is the first time that
a systematic analysis of the health-care financing equity has carried out at the level of
the single entities of a federal state (in this case, Switzerland at the cantonal level). The
goal of the present paper is to analyze the diﬀerences in the progressivity of the financing
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system at a sub-national level. Switzerland is an ideal country in which to add this new
piece of evidence, as it can be set in a context of fiscal federalism, where the sub-national
levels of governments (the cantons) have large freedom to decide on the financing sources
for health care and in the design of the tax system.
3 Swiss health system financing
The Swiss health-care system is financed through a mixed "private-social" scheme. Health
insurance has been mandatory since 1996, when the Health Insurance Act (HIA) came
into force. Each resident must pay a monthly premium that does not depend on the level
of income, while the Confederation and the cantons jointly provide public contributions
(as earmarked subsidies) to cover part of the premium for lower-income people.
As Figure 1 shows, all the contributions to the total financing of the health-care system
can be reduced to three main final direct actors: the households, the state, and the social
insurances.
Figure 1: The Swiss health system financing scheme.
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Approximately two-thirds of the total financing is collected from the households in an
income-independent way, while one-third is collected according to the households’ ability
to pay through the general taxation and general social insurance. The part of expenditure
that is directly financed by the household includes four components. Firstly, it is mainly
composed of the monthly community rated premium (social health insurance, or SHI) that
is compulsory for everyone and does not depend on income [9]. The second component
is the expenditures that correspond to the deductible and the co-payment [10]. Thirdly,
people can choose to have voluntary supplementary private health insurance (PHI) to
cover some health-care services that are not included in the basic contract, corresponding
to a premium [11]. The final component is out-of-pocket expenditures [2]. Since none of
these four components depends on income, the part directly financed by the households
can be considered as a regressive financing source.
The second part of expenditure is financed by the state, intended to be a combination of
the confederation, the cantons and the local jurisdictions. Part of the taxes at all these
levels are used to directly finance the health-care system, especially through hospital ex-
penses, nursing homes, and home care institutions’ subsidies, to fund prevention activities
for the earmarked subsidies for people with income under a certain threshold (diﬀerent in
each canton) and other benefits of social security. This financing source includes direct
and indirect taxes. The former depends on income and is supposed to be progressive,
while the second is independent of income (TVA) and is supposed to be regressive. De-
pending on the proportion of the two taxes, the overall impact of this source could be
regressive, progressive, or even proportional. Finally, the third actor is the general social
insurance, which contributes in the case of pensions, disability, and accident. As the social
contribution rate paid by citizens is the same for everyone, regardless of level of income,
this third financing source is expected to be proportional.
In sum, the Swiss system combines three forms of health-care financing, one of which
is likely to be regressive, one progressive, and one proportional. Some of the financing
strategy rules are decided at the federal level. However, Swiss federalism allows cantons
to make their own decision regarding which aspects of the financing policy they want to
adopt. According to cantons’ choices, diﬀerent equity (or inequity) levels are determined
in each canton.
Firstly, a diﬀerent mixture of the three financing sources chosen by each canton deter-
mines a diﬀerent level of regressivity: cantons that rely more on the SHI than on public
expenditure are more likely to be regressive than those that choose to finance the system
more through general taxation.
Secondly, cantonal autonomy due to fiscal federalism allows significant leeway in deciding
the subsidies policy for the worse-oﬀ (Balthasar et al. 2008, Gilardi and Füglister 2008,
Kägi et al. 2012).
As mentioned, for people earning an income under a certain threshold, the confederation
(for two-thirds) and the cantons (for one third) fund earmarked subsidies that cover part
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(or the total) of the monthly premium. The federalism allows cantons to make their own
decisions regarding the eligibility criteria for receiving benefits, which creates diﬀerences
and disparities in their distribution. The choice of the subsidies’ policy brings diﬀerences
to the level of regressivity among cantons.
Thirdly, each canton can choose a diﬀerent scale of tax rate that determines a diﬀerent
level of progressivity. The same is also true at the municipal level; indeed, each munici-
pality can choose a tax multiplier that is a percentage of the cantonal tax, creating other
diﬀerences in the regressivity level. Fourthly, the major reform of 1996 (HIA) adopted
more binding financing rules for the subsidies to be given to hospitals of "public interest"
(for the in-patient health care). Until 2011, it was compulsory for each canton to con-
tribute at least 50 percent to the finance of the in-patient treatments in public hospitals.
For private hospitals, cantonal participation was voluntary. Starting in 2012, the new
hospital financing requires a 55 percent public share in the DRG payment, irrespective
of hospital ownership. Therefore, the choice of which part of inpatient costs to cover,
specifically how many hospitals may be considered as serving the public interest, is a
cantonal decision and it is another determinant of diﬀerent equity levels in the financing
system. Indeed, the amount of choice left open by this law has an impact on the equity of
the system: the larger the part financed by the tax system, the higher the redistribution
and the lower the inequity.
So, the fiscal federalism in Switzerland provides the cantons with a wide scope of action to
the cantons: diﬀerent policies can lead to diﬀerent equity levels. The aim of the present
study is to explore this aspect of Swiss federalism, shedding light on the impact that
diﬀerent policies have on the financing equity. We have been forced to focus our analysis
on socialized health expenditure because the data availability did not allow us to have
a reliable proxy for the out-of-pocket and co-payment component. The socialized health
expenditure includes the public health expenditures and expenses that are covered by the
basic health and general insurance that aims to finance the compulsory basket of health
care.2
2The socialized health expenditure represents approximately 60 percent of the total health expendi-
ture and it includes the part financed by the state, the part financed by the general social insurance,
and the social health insurance. The private households’ expenditure (that is, out-of-pocket payments,
deductibles, co-payment, and voluntary private health insurance) are not included in this definition.
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Table 2: Socialized health expenditure - Absolute value (2005) and share of each
financing source (average 1998-2005).
Sources of financing- Average
values for the years 1998 and 2000-2005
Total health
expenditure
(CHF per
capita) - Year
2005
Federal
taxes (direct
+VAT)
Cantonal
and munici-
pal taxes
General
social insur-
ance
Social health
insurance
(net premi-
ums)
Zurich (ZH) 4198 10% 29% 13% 48%
Bern (BE) 4297 11% 30% 13% 46%
Luzern (LU) 3461 13% 25% 16% 46%
Uri (UR) 3379 13% 26% 16% 45%
Schwyz (SZ) 3581 13% 25% 15% 47%
Obwalden (OW) 3155 14% 27% 16% 43%
Nidwalden (NW) 3385 13% 27% 16% 44%
Glarus (GL) 3541 12% 30% 14% 44%
Zug (ZG) 3885 12% 30% 14% 44%
Fribourg (FR) 3876 12% 28% 14% 46%
Solothurn (SO) 4002 11% 26% 14% 49%
Basel-Stadt (BS) 5854 8% 39% 9% 44%
Basel-Landschaft (BL) 4197 11% 27% 13% 49%
Schaﬀausen (SH) 4070 11% 31% 13% 45%
Appenzell a Rh. (AR) 3505 13% 27% 16% 44%
Appenzell i Rh. (AI) 2988 16% 20% 19% 45%
St. Gallen (SG) 3465 13% 24% 15% 48%
Graubünden (GR) 3837 12% 29% 14% 45%
Aargau (AG) 3575 13% 20% 15% 52%
Thurgau (TG) 3204 14% 19% 16% 51%
Ticino (TI) 4852 10% 29% 12% 49%
Vaud (VD) 4858 9% 30% 11% 50%
Wallis (VS) 3732 12% 30% 14% 44%
Neuchâtel (NE) 5017 9% 33% 11% 47%
Geneva (GE) 6578 7% 43% 8% 42%
Jura (JU) 4381 10% 30% 12% 48%
Switzerland (CH ) 4243 11% 29% 13% 47%
The first column in Table 2 considers the amount of the socialized health expenditure
for each canton and for the whole Switzerland in absolute per capita values for 2005. In
Table 2, and in the following analysis, the socialized health expenditure has been divided
into four financing sources: federal taxes (including direct and VAT), cantonal and munic-
ipal taxes together (henceforth we will refer to this second group of tax simply as cantonal
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tax ), social health insurance (net premiums), and general social insurance.
The available data does not provide any information about the direct federal health expen-
diture given to each canton or the amount of health expenditure from the social insurance
(AVS-AI) spent in each canton. To compute these two values, we took the total amount
of expenditure and simply imputed the same average spending for each Swiss inhabitant,
regardless of the canton in which he or she lived. In the expenditure of the confederation
and the cantons, we also accounted for the amount of the subsidies distributed.
The last four columns of Table 2 represent the proportion of the expenditure financed by
each source. We computed an average for the considered period (1998 and from 2000 to
2005) of the weight of each financing source.
The first evidence from the table relates to the absolute level of expenditure and diﬀers
greatly between cantons. With respect to the Swiss average of 4243 CHF (registered in
2005, the most recent considered in the analysis), canton Geneva and Basel city present
the highest value of expenditures, with 6578 and 5854 CHF, respectively. Cantons Ap-
penzell Inner Rhodes and Obwalden register the smallest expenditure values (with 2988
CHF and 3155 CHF, respectively).
However, the diﬀerences do not only concern the total amount of expenditure: another
evident diﬀerence between cantons is the proportion of each of the single financing sources.
The table also shows that, in cantons where the total expenditure is higher, the share of
the cantonal part is also higher. This is because, where the total expenditure is higher,
the level of premium is also higher (Basel City and Geneva have the highest levels of aver-
age premiums), which means that there is greater need for subsidies. This leads cantons
to spend more to finance subsidies for the worse-oﬀ. The values in the table show that
the most important part is financed health insurers (net premiums). This accounts, on
average, for 47 percent of the socialized expenditure. The second source derives from the
cantonal taxes that cover 30 percent of the socialized expenditures, followed by the social
insurance and federal taxes that account for 13 percent and 11 percent, respectively. It
is worth noting the diﬀerences among cantons. There are two cantons for which the part
financed by cantonal taxes is considerably larger: Geneva (43 percent) and Basel City (39
percent). If we then compare Geneva with Appenzhell Inner Rhodes, for example, the
diﬀerences are significant: the former chooses to finance 44 percent of the expenditures
with cantonal taxes and 42 percent by premiums, while the weightings in the latter are
20 percent and 45 percent, respectively.
4 The dataset
The micro dataset is the Swiss Household Income and Expenditure Survey (SHIES), which
allows computation of household income at a very detailed level, including all the taxes and
social contributions paid, as well as the health revenues (subsidies and reimbursements)
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and expenditures (premiums paid and, to some extent, out-of-pocket expenditures).
This survey is available from 1998 to 2005 (excluding 1999) and is based on a sample
of the Swiss population (approximately 3500 households observed for each of the years
between 2000 and 2005, and 9295 observations for 1998).
The original idea of this work was to distinguish between both the variation across Swiss
cantons (between variation) and over time (within variation); unfortunately, however, this
dataset does not allow this to be done. The SHIES does not guarantee that the households
sample is representative of all the cantons for each year, but only for seven macro regions,
each of which groups cantons together according to their geographical position.3 As the
focus of this work is to control for the diﬀerences due to the federal setting, it seemed
important to maintain the cantonal dimension. For this reason, we decided to merge the
dataset of each year to obtain a representative sample at the cantonal level. This has
been possible because diﬀerent people were interviewed each year for each canton4.
The gain in the robustness of results reached in this way is balanced by the loss of the
ability to analyze the time variation dimension; in this way, it is not possible to account
for the variation over time for each canton. Ultimately, this study concentrates on the
between-variation for each canton and on the within-variation only for the whole Switzer-
land and the seven macro regions.
The SHIES presents some diﬀerences in the questionnaires, especially for 1998 with re-
spect to the other years. Only in the wave of interviews taken in 1998 were people asked
to report all the medical expenses (greater than 150 CHF) they had incurred during the
year preceding the month of the survey, and not only all the medical expenses they had
during the month of the interview (as it is in the other waves of the survey). Moreover,
for 1998 the reimbursements received by the insurance companies during the whole year
are registered, as this ensures a correspondence between the expenditures and their re-
imbursements. The collection of this data makes it possible to compute the out-pocket
expenditures for each households and, consequently, to have a robust proxy for the yearly
out-of-pocket financing and at least for 1998.
3Macroregion 1 includes Vaud, Wallis, and Geneva; macroregion 2 includes Bern, Fribourg, Solothurn,
Neuchâtel, and Jura; macroregion 3 includes Basel Stadt, Basel Land, and Aargau; macroregion 4 includes
Zurich; macroregion 5 includes Glarus, Schaﬀhausen, Appenzell a. Rh., Appenzell i. Rh., St. Gallen,
Graubünden, and Thurgau; macroregion 6 includes Luzern, Uri, Schwyz, Nidwalden, Obwalden, and Zug;
macroregion 7 includes Ticino.
4To check whether the aggregation of data for each canton brought to a reliable sample representation,
we compared the simple Gini coeﬃcient on the basis of the gross income with the same Gini coeﬃcient
computed for each canton in the study Regionale Einkommens und Vermögensverteilung in der Schweiz.
In this study the authors used the oﬃcial tax data declared by the Swiss population. In this work they
considered the entire population, not just a statistical sample. From this comparison, it is evident that
the results for some cantons are similar, but not for all. Nevertheless, the computation based on this
other dataset also presents some methodological shortcomings that do not allow us to determine which
of the two is more reliable.
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5 The measures of equity in health-care finance
5.1 Kakwani index
In order to measure the regressivity of each financing source, we used the procedure
proposed by Wagstaﬀ et al. (1999). We started by computing the Kakwani index for
each financing source and then aggregated these results with a weighted average, using
as weights the proportion of each financing source with respect to the total financing, as
shown in section 3. This procedure has been applied to 23 cantons5, to the seven macro-
regions, and to Switzerland as a whole.
This index is computed as the diﬀerence between the concentration index of the financing
source and the Gini index calculated on the (equivalent disposable) household income
before considering any health-related expenditures (we refer to this as pre-health income).
The formula is as follows:
Kip = CIip  Gini_prei Range : [ 2 : +1] (1)
where i indicates the geographical unit of analysis (23 cantons, seven macro-regions,
and Switzerland as a whole) and p the diﬀerent financing sources available in the dataset:
federal taxes, cantonal (and municipal) taxes, social health insurance (net premiums),
and general social contributions.
CIip is the concentration index of each financing source p. CI is twice the area be-
tween the concentration curve of the source p and the 45-degree line. It indicates whether
the variable of interest is more concentrated among the poor (the concentration curve lies
above the equality line and the index has a negative value) or among the rich (the curve
lies below the equality line and the index has a positive value).
Gini_prei is the Gini index for the equivalent disposable income before considering
health financing. This means that the amount spent on financing health care has not
been subtracted from this measure of income.
Since the Swiss fiscal system does not rely on earmarked taxes for health care, we had
to impute the amount of taxes that each individual household used to finance the health
care system. We simply computed the share of health expenditure financed by each source
and then attributed that share to the amount of taxes paid by each household. We did
this for federal tax, cantonal tax, and general social insurance.
Gini_prei is computed according to the following formula:
5Canton Uri, canton Appenzell Inner Rhodes, and canton Appenzell Ausser Rhodes have not been
considered because the small number of observations in the dataset did not allow for any robust compu-
tation.
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Y_preh =
NX
k=1
yhk  
mX
s=1
(1  µs)schs  
pX
v=1
(1  ⌧v)thv (2)
where:
• PNk=1 yhk is the gross income for the household h, which, according to the definition
given in Bilger (2008), consists of the sum of all income earned from work and self-
employment, interest, house rental, social insurance benefits, revenues from other
insurances, and other indemnities.
• Pms=1(1   µs)schs is the part of the general social contributions (pensions and sur-
vivors insurance, disability insurance, accident insurance6) paid by the household
h and not directed towards financing health care. In particular, µs is the share of
health care services funded out of the budget of the social insurance. In 2005, µs
was 3.3 percent for the pension and survivors insurance, and 24.5 percent for each
of accident and disability insurance.
• Ppv=1(1 ⌧v)thv is the taxes (federal, cantonal and communal) paid by the household
h and not directed towards financing the healthcare system. As in Bilger (2008),
federal indirect taxes were proxied with VAT, which accounts for two-thirds of total
indirect taxes. VAT has been computed from the data on consumptions that house-
hold declared in the survey. As in the case of social contribution, ⌧vis the part used
to finance the health care system for each type of tax (v), so 1  ⌧v the residual part
that is not used within the health sector.
To give an idea of the dimension of these coeﬃcients, in 2005 ⌧v was 5.4 percent for
federal tax, 28.5 percent (on average) for cantonal tax and 4.3 percent (on average)
for communal tax.
Disposable income before health-care financing has been corrected using an equivalence
scale in order to make households with a diﬀerent number of members comparable.7
Moreover, as diﬀerent years are pooled together, the values have been deflated through
the consumer price index (CPI) for Switzerland.
Table 3 presents the results of the Kakwani index over time for all of Switzerland and the
seven macro-regions.
The most notable result from Table 3 is that the total value of Kakwani index is al-
ways negative, which means that the Swiss health-care system financing remains quite
regressive, even after the major reform of 1996; this result is in line with the previous
6The Swiss acronyms of these social insurances are AHV/AVS, IV/AI, and UVG/LAA/LAINF, re-
spectively.
7The scale chosen is the OECD modified equivalence scale, which assigns a value of 1 to the household
head, of 0.5 to each additional adult member and of 0.3 to each child no older than 13.
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Table 3: Kakwani index over time
1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Macroregion 1 -0.1365** -0.0915** -0.0691** -0.0652** -0.0990** -0.0901** -0.0749**
Macroregion 2 -0.1064** -0.0813** -0.0815** -0.1093** -0.1052** -0.0856** -0.1093**
Macroregion 3 -0.1030** -0.0995** -0.0440* -0.0621** -0.0653** -0.0767** -0.0845**
Macroregion 4 -0.1302** -0.1387** -0.0921** -0.0947** -0.1043** -0.1115** -0.1127**
Macroregion 5 -0.1305** -0.1160** -0.1259** -0.1197** -0.0847** -0.1371** -0.1479**
Macroregion 6 -0.1367** -0.1351** -0.0804* -0.0899** -0.1086** -0.1259** -0.0759**
Macroregion 7 -0.0877** -0.0746** -0.0778** -0.0348 -0.0271 -0.0833** -0.0163
literature. The other notable point is that the results do not seem to vary widely in the
years considered, either for all of Switzerland or for any of the macro-regions. The most
regressive year appears to be 1998, although the data does provides no evidence of any
clear temporal trend.
Macroregion 7 (Ticino) seems to reach the best value in terms of equity, for all the
years considered, being proportional in 2002, 2003 and 2005. Macroregion 4 (Zurich) is
in line with the Swiss average, and macro-region 3 is, after Ticino, the least regressive
group of cantons.
The weighted Kakwani index for the socialized health expenditure in Switzerland is
bounded between -0.084, reached in 2001, and -0.13 in 1998.8
Table 4 presents the Kakwani indexes for the Swiss cantons and helps shed light on
how fiscal federalism allows cantons to choose their preferred financing policy. Results
include the eﬀects of the political choices of cantons and municipalities (tax rate scale,
entitlement policy for earmarked allowances), but also of the individual choices that are
allowed by the Swiss health system setting (premium and deductible level).
It is evident from the table that there are important diﬀerences in the regressivity of
the financing system among cantons.
The diﬀerences in the federal taxes are not impressive. The Kakwani index for this fi-
nancing source is not statistically diﬀerent from zero for all the cantons apart from canton
Basel Land (BL), which has a slightly progressive value. This means that federal taxes
are concentrated quite proportionally among the population. These results could be ex-
plained by saying that the value considered here is the sum of the federal direct tax (based
on income) that is progressive, and an indirect tax (VAT) that is normally regressive, as
the rate is the same for everyone, regardless of income, and savings are concentrated in
higher income classes. Canton Basel is the only one in which the eﬀect of the progressive
8As explained, data for 1998 was collected in a diﬀerent manner that makes it possible to compute the
Kakwani index for the total health expenditure, including the out-of-pocket payment for each household
as well as the complementary insurance premiums. We did this for all of Switzerland and found that,
when considering the total expenditure, the equity results are even worse (Kakwani -0.14).
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Table 4: Kakwani index across cantons
Federal Cantonal and General Social health Weighted
taxes municipal sociaol insurance (net Kakwani
taxes insurance premiums) index
ZH 0.0088 0.0389 0.0074 -0.2548** -0.1085**
BE -0.0052 -0.0121 0.0330** -0.2086** -0.0947**
LU -0.0069 0.0181 0.0560** -0.2298** -0.0936**
SZ -0.0578 -0.0417 0.0025 -0.2508** -0.1344**
OW 0.0387 0.0744 0.0999** -0.2323** -0.0567**
NW 0.0236 0.1256 0.0594 -0.2738 ** -0.0729**
GL 0.0063 0.0135 0.0366 -0.2304 ** -0.0913**
ZG 0.1093 0.0540 -0.0230 -0.2603 ** -0.0871**
FR -0.0159 -0.0121 0.0246 -0.1863 ** -0.0874**
SO -0.0311 0.0473** 0.0536 ** -0.2109** -0.0868**
BS 0.0485 0.0835 -0.0001 -0.2149 ** -0.0582**
BL 0.0557* 0.0933** -0.0042 -0.2191** -0.0774**
SH -0.0963 -0.1310 -0.0059 -0.2239 ** -0.1535**
SG 0.0011 0.0407 0.0369* -0.2571 ** -0.1066**
GR -0.0481 -0.0327 0.0231 -0.2605** -0.1285**
AG 0.0200 0.0308 0.0147 -0.2250 ** -0.1065**
TG 0.0251 -0.0372 0.0406* -0.2281 ** -0.1131**
TI 0.0122 0.0850** 0.0310 * -0.1800** -0.0592**
VD -0.0148 0.0131 -0.0099 -0.2050 ** -0.1004**
VS -0.0464 -0.0435 -0.0006 -0.2123 ** -0.1114**
NE -0.0526 0.0306 -0.0035 -0.2009 ** -0.0904**
GE 0.0277 0.0976 -0.0673** -0.2482** -0.0643*
JU -0.0076 0.0799 0.0549 -0.1809 ** -0.0566**
CH 0.0074 0.0153 0.0090* -0.2271 ** -0.0999**
direct tax more than oﬀsets the eﬀect of the regressive VAT.
The Kakwani indexes for the cantonal and municipal taxes are more diﬃcult to explain.
While we would expect a highly progressive value, most of them are not statistically dif-
ferent from zero, which suggests proportionality. Only Solothurn (SO), Ticino (TI), and
Basel (BL) present a slightly positive value of the Kakwani index, which means a slightly
progressive tax. These values are smaller than the results expected, but there are at least
two reasons that could explain them.
First of all, this financing source includes both cantonal and municipal tax. Very rich
households may choose to live in jurisdictions that have a lower local (municipal) taxa-
tion. Therefore, a richer household may have to pay the same cantonal tax, but a diﬀerent
(lower) municipal tax than a poorer household that lives in a municipality with higher
taxation. This could bias the progressivity results in favor of proportionality.
A second reason could be the fact that there is a mismatching between household income
that refers to the year of the interview and household taxes that are paid on income
earned the year prior to the interview. There could be situations in which a person has
reduced his or her revenues or did not have an income at all (perhaps because they have
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temporarily lost their job or have retired), but have to pay taxes because they earned
a "regular" income in the previous year. This could worsen the situation of regressivity
because the Kakwani index is computed as if tax paid and income earned referred to the
same year; that is the case for the majority of the interviewees, but not all.9
As expected, the Kakwani indexes for the general social insurance are mostly near to
proportionality, because the tax rate is the same for every wage earned, regardless of its
level. Nevertheless, there are some exceptions. Four cantons (Bern, Luzern, Obwalden,
and Solothurn) present a progressive value, while canton Geneva is the only one that has
a regressive index for this financing source. This could be because the capital income rate
over the total income in that canton is higher than in the other cantons: the fact that the
payment for the social insurance is only based on wage income could induce a regressive
eﬀect in the results.
The most interesting results are those of the Kakwani index for the net social health insur-
ance. They are all significant for each canton and range from a value of -0.18 for canton
Ticino to -0.27 for canton Nidwalden.
It is quite notable that the values can be so diﬀerent, even in neighboring cantons: the
value of the index in canton Graubunden is 0.08 less than that of its neighbor, Ticino
(-0.26). This value probably hides a diﬀerent choice in the subsidy policy that is freely
chosen by cantonal authorities. It is likely that the subsidy policy is more generous in
the cantons where the premiums are less regressive than in the others. This intuition is
also confirmed, at least for Ticino, by Crivelli et al. (2008), who explained that subsidy
policy in Ticino is 34.5 percent more generous than the Swiss average.
With respect to this financing source, however, the value of Kakwani includes something
more than the eﬀects of the earmarked subsidies chosen by the cantons. Also, the indi-
vidual choices (premium and deductible) allowed by the competitive setting of the Swiss
health insurance have a significant impact on equity. The Swiss system encourages com-
petition between insurance companies, which is based totally on the level of the premium;
twice per year, people have the option to switch to another insurance company (with
lower premiums, for example). It could be the case that richer people, who generally
have greater access to the information, will decide to insure themselves with the most
convenient companies, paying lower premiums. The consequence of this, of course, is that
rich people pay lower premiums compared to worse-oﬀ people, which may create regres-
sivity in the general system, despite the subsidy policy. Moreover, citizens are allowed to
obtain a discount on the monthly premiums by choosing a higher deductible; by assuming
9There is another factor to consider: the tax reform. In 1990, a new federal law came into force
regarding the fiscal harmonization of direct taxes. According to this law, all the cantons had to change
the procedure for paying and collecting taxes: the passage was from a system in which taxes where paid
for the income earned during the two preceding years, to a system in which taxes were paid for the income
earned in only one year - precisely, the same year in which taxes are paid. From 1990 until 2003, all
cantons had to adopt their taxation systems to the new law. A consequence of this was that in each
canton there were two years of "tax holes"; that is, the income earned in those two years has never been
taxed. This may have created some asymmetries in our computations as well.
19
some of the risk of getting sick themselves, they can pay a smaller monthly premium.
Similarly, people who choose to be part of a managed care plan can also get a discount on
premiums. These two choices are not constrained to a certain level of income, so everyone
can choose them. In this case, the economic burden for financing the health care system
may be shifted from the good risk people to the bad risk people. This may also have
some consequences on the equity level. It is easier to choose a contract with a higher
deductible only if people have access to the information, which is normally the case for
people who are richer (or better educated), but not rich enough not to have interest in
a discounted premium. Therefore, it may be the case that good risk people belonging to
the upper-middle income class may have an incentive to make this decision, provoking an
increase in the level of regressivity. Another scenario may be that people who are in the
low-middle income class (but not low enough to receive subsidies) may opt for a higher
deductible, which moves the economic burden from the lower-middle class to the upper-
middle class. Depending on which of the two eﬀects oﬀsets the other, the regressivity
level may be increased or reduced.
Therefore, this value of the Kakwani index also includes these possible eﬀects.
Finally, the last results to comment on are those that are relative to the total Kakwani:
they are all statistically significant10 and all are negative.
The cantons that appear to be the most regressive ones are canton Schaﬀhausen and
Schwyz, with a Kakwani equal to -0.15 and -0.13, respectively. The cantons that reach
the best results in terms of equity are Jura, Obwalden and Ticino, all of which have a
Kakwani value of around -0.05. It is worth noting that the diﬀerence between the least
and the most regressive canton (approximately 0.10) is considerable; it is the same dif-
ference we get comparing in the Wagstaﬀ et al.’s (1999) study USA (-0.13) and Sweden
(0.015), countries that have two completely diﬀerent health-care financing systems.
5.2 Concentration curves and dominance test
The Kakwani index is an extremely synthetic measure of regressivity that is useful for
providing summary information about the level of progressivity. However, this informa-
tion can be sometimes misleading if the distribution underlying the Kakwani index is not
also considered. When curves cross, the result of the Kakwani index is no more clear: a
value equal to zero could indicate proportionality, but it could also be the result of a con-
centration curve that is progressive for half of the population and regressive for the other
half. In order to consider the distribution of the progressivity for the whole population,
10The standard error for the total Kakwani index has been obtained summing the standard errors for
the single components (i) according to the formula:
se =
sX
i
(wisei)2 + 2
X
ij
(wiwjcovij) 8i 6= j (3)
.
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it is necessary to look at the concentration curves and the relative dominance test.
The dominance test aims to define statistically whether one curve dominates another.
The null hypothesis indicates that there is no significant diﬀerence between the two con-
centration curves considered. The choice criterion used here is the multiple comparison
approach. In the comparison between the two curves, the null is rejected if there is at
least one significant diﬀerence between them in one direction and no significant diﬀerence
in the other direction. The ordinates are compared in 19 diﬀerent quintiles, as suggested
by O’Donnel et al. (2008).
A general summary comment, based only on the visual inspection of the concentration
curves, would suggest that their order follows a similar pattern for all the cantons. Firstly,
starting from the 45-degree line and going down, the net premium curve is always the
first one, very close to the 45-degree line and not crossing with the others. Secondly,
the social contribution curve is generally the next one, always very near to the Lorenz
curve, which indicates proportionality. Thirdly, the federal tax line is also quite near to
the Lorenz curve and, finally, the cantonal tax curve is always the most distant and lies
under the Lorenz, indicating progressivity. Nevertheless, the two curves for taxes and the
one relative to the social insurance often cross among them and with the Lorenz, which
indicates an alternation between regressivity among the poorer and progressivity among
the richer.
We have chosen to show the concentration curves and the relative dominance tests for
some of the cantons that presented the most interesting results in terms of Kakwani in-
dex. These were cantons Geneva, which is among the least regressive, and canton Zurich,
because it presents values of the Kakwani that are close to the Swiss average and because
it is one of the seven macro-regions upon which the SHIES sample is yearly-based, so it
should provide very robust results.
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Figure 2: Concentration curves for each financing source, canton Geneva
Table 5: Geneva
Federal Cantonal Social insurance Premiums
Quantile Cum. Cum. Diﬀ. from Cum. Diﬀ. from Cum. Diﬀ. from Cum. Diﬀ. from
share of y share income share share income share share income share share income share
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
q10 2.78% 6.26% 0.0013 4.32% 0.1920 4.57% 0.1796 8.08% 0.0000
q20 8.24% 10.55% 0.0473 7.40% 0.5075 10.06% 0.1856 16.62% 0.0000
q30 14.75% 15.61% 0.4948 11.21% 0.0124 16.87% 0.1379 26.16% 0.0000
q40 22.35% 22.04% 0.8278 16.60% 0.0002 23.15% 0.5847 36.71% 0.0000
q50 30.82% 29.29% 0.3568 23.69% 0.0000 31.75% 0.5389 47.10% 0.0000
q60 40.31% 37.41% 0.1384 32.80% 0.0003 43.70% 0.0300 57.73% 0.0000
q70 50.92% 46.08% 0.0328 42.95% 0.0008 55.78% 0.0021 68.60% 0.0000
q80 62.85% 57.53% 0.0477 53.94% 0.0012 70.27% 0.0000 79.40% 0.0000
q90 76.98% 71.94% 0.1137 69.61% 0.0275 83.72% 0.0000 89.47% 0.0000
Figures 2 and 3 represent the concentration curves of each financing source for canton
Geneva and canton Zurich, respectively. Relying on visual inspection alone, the diﬀer-
ences in the curve’s trends are not great between the two cantons. The dominance test
presents diﬀerent results, however. In both cantons, the concentration curves for the net
premiums are very close to the 45-degree line, indicating quite strong regressivity, and
they dominate the Lorenz curve. The level of regressivity for this source is more or less
the same in the two cantons. For example, the poorer 30 percent of the population owns
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about the 15 percent of the total income in both cantons, and it pays 26 percent of the
net premiums in canton Geneva, and 27 percent in canton Zurich (see Table 5 and Table
6).
In canton Zurich, all the curves for the other sources cross and the test does not give
evidence for dominance. Instead, for canton Geneva there is dominance of the social con-
tributions curve on the Lorenz curve and dominance of the Lorenz curve on the cantonal
tax curve. These two last results tell us two important things. Firstly, the dominance for
the social contribution curve confirms the result of the Kakwani index: the social con-
tributions are regressive in Geneva, while the situation is diﬀerent for the cantonal tax.
This financing source seems to be progressive, but only starting from the second decile of
the ranked population (that is, for the richest 80 percent). For the poorest 20 percent of
the ranked population, it may be considered proportional (as the diﬀerence between the
two curves is not statistically significant).
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Figure 3: Concentration curves for each financing source, canton Zurich
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Table 6: Zurich
Federal Cantonal Social insurance Premiums
Quantile Cum. Cum. Diﬀ. from Cum. Diﬀ. from Cum. Diﬀ. from Cum. Diﬀ. from
share of y share income share share income share share income share share income share
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
q10 2.93% 6.62% 0.0000 7.29% 0.0004 2.72% 0.4227 8.68% 0.0000
q20 8.16% 11.17% 0.0000 10.66% 0.0385 7.00% 0.0008 17.43% 0.0000
q30 14.61% 16.74% 0.0004 15.17% 0.6327 13.50% 0.0087 27.08% 0.0000
q40 22.15% 23.18% 0.0979 20.74% 0.2234 20.43% 0.0003 37.53% 0.0000
q50 30.70% 30.34% 0.5794 27.66% 0.0073 28.80% 0.0004 47.91% 0.0000
q60 40.24% 38.54% 0.0136 35.44% 0.0000 38.88% 0.0205 58.12% 0.0000
q70 50.92% 47.40% 0.0000 44.61% 0.0000 50.33% 0.3527 68.68% 0.0000
q80 62.99% 59.14% 0.0000 57.45% 0.0000 63.68% 0.3063 78.99% 0.0000
q90 77.17% 72.76% 0.0000 71.79% 0.0000 79.37% 0.0019 89.34% 0.0000
6 Discussion
As we have seen, the leeway of fiscal federalism makes it possible to reach very diﬀerent
results in terms of regressivity across cantons. Indeed, the policy chosen by the cantons
has a direct eﬀect on the regressivity level and also an indirect (or endogenous) one, as it
may aﬀect individual choices. If a canton (or a municipality) opts for a less progressive
taxation, this decision has a direct impact on the level of equity: with respect to a canton
in which the tax rates are more progressive, this will of course be less equitable. This has
also an endogenous eﬀect, however, in that very rich people may decide to live there to
pay less taxes and this may also have an impact on the regressivity level.11 When reading
these results in a federal context, it is important to keep in mind that there are some
eﬀects that are not evident with a simple Kakwani index. Although it is a useful index,
it has some limitations and is not able to capture all the eﬀects that may have a role in
determining such level of regressivity. In this regard, another consideration needs to be
specified. The present study has only considered the level of regressivity of the cantons,
regardless of their average income level. The Kakwani index considers only the relative
value of income and financing burden, not the absolute one. There can be two diﬀerent
cantons, one of which (canton A) adopts a more progressive policy than the other (canton
B). Let us assume that the distribution of income in relative terms is precisely the same,
so that the better-oﬀ of the two cantons own the same share of the total income and
the worse-oﬀ people have the same economic situation in the two cantons. This does not
imply that the worse-oﬀ in canton A pay less in absolute value than those in canton B; we
can only infer that the worse-oﬀ in canton A pay less in relative terms, (that is, they pay
less compared to the rich than what would be the case in canton B). However, it could be
11If this eﬀect increases or decreases, the regressivity depends on the distribution of income among the
population.
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that the poor in canton A have to pay more in absolute value than the poor in canton B.
Moreover, section 3 has shown the diﬀerence in the levels of health-care expenditure. The
premium level is normally related to health-care expenditure, which means that where ex-
penditure is higher, premiums are also higher. Even if health-care financing in one canton
is less regressive than in another (for example, if Ticino is less regressive than Graubun-
den), the worse-oﬀ would have to pay a higher premium in Ticino than in Graubunden.
This would ultimately mean that it is more convenient for such individuals to live in a
place where they carry a comparatively higher economic burden than better-oﬀ people.
To check for this, we computed the incidence of health expenditure on the total income
for diﬀerent income classes. This provided a measure that considers the absolute value
of the eﬀort of lower-income individuals (as well as for higher-income individuals). We
found that there is a similar general trend for all cantons; specifically, the incidence for
the lower-income classes is heavy and decreases for the richer classes.
To exemplify this, the graphic representations for the incidence of the financing burden
for the cantons of Zug and Geneva are reported below (Figure 4).
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Figure 4: Average incidence of the socialized health expenditure on income, Zug
and Geneva
The red line represents the average incidence for each of the income classes considered,
while the blue-shadow area indicates the confidence intervals. Interestingly, the two red
lines have a similar shape, although the line for Geneva is shifted upwards with respect
to the other. With an exception for the first income class, the level of incidence is quite
diﬀerent: the share of income that people in Geneva pay is almost double that of those in
Zug. This means that people in Geneva (one of the least inequitable cantons) pay more,
not only in absolute value, but also as a percentage on their income than in Zug (one of
the most inequitable cantons). In other words, the burden of health-care financing may be
equally distributed, but may be too heavy to be aﬀordable for lower- and middle-income
people.
The reason for such a result can easily be found by simply looking again at the abso-
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lute level of expenditure (Table 2): Geneva registers one of the highest levels (6578 CHF
per capita), while Zug has one of the lowest ones (3885 CHF per capita). This example
clearly shows that, to have a clear understanding of the equity issue, the importance of
the absolute expenditure levels cannot be neglected.
The subsidy policy adopted by the cantons also has an essential impact on the regres-
sivity level. It is the most important tool that cantons have in deciding the extent to which
their financing policy is able to mitigate the regressive nature of the community-rated pre-
miums. The analysis shows that the subsidy policy does not succeed in making the total
financing proportional or progressive as the concentration curve for the net premiums is
always far above the Lorenz curve, which represents strong regressivity.
7 Conclusions
This study represents the first attempt to investigate the impact of federalism on the
financing of a universal health insurance system in terms of equity. The results contained
in this work shed light on some of the aspects that cannot be neglected in re-thinking a
new possible reform of the Swiss health-care system, but important lessons can also be
drawn for other federal states (like the U.S.) that use regulation and subsidies to ensure
universal coverage.
We have analyzed the financing of the Swiss health-care system from an equity point
of view, with particular attention on the diﬀerences across cantons. We used the Kak-
wani progressivity index for each financing source to see how each of them shifts from
proportionality. The Kakwani index used in the analysis is a useful way to measure
the magnitude of the regressivity of the system, but it does have some limitations. The
dominance test for the concentration curves has also been performed to exploit more the
available information.
The general results suggest that Swiss health-care system financing is regressive in all
cantons, although there are diﬀerences among them. The reason for this lies in the fed-
eral setting, which allows cantons to have some freedom in certain areas, such as how to
design subsidy policies for lower-income people, the choice of tax rates, and the choice of
how much of the total expenditure has to be financed through taxation and how much
through mandatory health insurance. These factors, together with the peculiarities of
the Swiss health-care system based on competition among insurance companies and on
the supply of premium discounts for people opting for higher deductibles and managed
care contracts, bring diﬀerent levels of inequity. The results highlight the fact that the
most regressive financing source is the social health insurance, followed by federal taxes
and general social insurance (both of which turn out to be near to proportionality), and
finally the cantonal tax, which is progressive in the majority of the cantons. Moreover,
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the results for all of Switzerland do not highlight significant diﬀerences over the temporal
interval from 1998 to 2005.
With regard to the equity issue, one possible criticism is the potential trade-oﬀ between
equity and eﬃciency, according to what Okun theorized in 1975. To check for this, we
considered the eﬃciency results found in a study by Widmer and Zweifel (2012) in which
they performed a data envelopment analysis for the Swiss cantons for six categories of
public goods, including health, using data relative to the years 2000-2004. We ranked the
cantons first according to our equity results and then according to the eﬃciency results
found by the two authors. We compared the two ranking lists through a Spearman test
and a Kendall test of rank correlation, but the results do not reject the null hypothesis
of independence. This leads to the conclusion that there is no direct link between equity
and eﬃciency.12
As already highlighted, the methods generally used in the health economics literature
to measure the equity of financing can only be considered a valid policy instrument if
read together with the others. The level of progressivity in a canton is not enough to
be taken as a benchmark of the level of well-being of lower-income and middle-income
people. It is also necessary to control for the absolute level of expenditure that lower-
and middle-income people have to aﬀord. In other words, from a policy point of view it
is essential to bear in mind that equity and aﬀordability are two diﬀerent measures that
are not necessarily correlated.
For the analysis, we considered so-called socialized health expenditures, due to the infor-
mation availability and characteristics of the dataset. A suggestion for future research
would be to extend the study to the whole expenditure in order to also monitor the impact
of out-of-pocket expenditures, deductibles, and co-payments. Nevertheless, the values we
found can be taken as baseline inequity that could only become worse once these other
financing sources were added to the analysis.
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